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THE NEW ARTICLE 310 OF THE FRENCH CIVIL CODE
FOR INTERNATIONAL DIVORCE ACTIONS
Thomas E. Carbonneau*
INTRODUCTION

The variety and complexity of the legal issues that can confront a
French court in an international divorce action' may best be illustrated
by a description of the basic factual pattern of, and the initial arguments advanced in, some of the more typical cases:
1. French National Spouse v. Foreign National Spouse.
After their marriage in Marseilles, Spouse A, a French national,
and Spouse B, a Spanish national, moved to Madrid. Several years
later, they obtained a judicial separation from a Madrid tribunal. Although they continued to live in Madrid, they maintained residences in
different parts of the city.
The year following their separation, Spouse A filed a request before
the Tribunal de grande instance of Marseilles to have the Spanish
separation converted to a divorce under French law. Upon receiving
notice of the action, Spouse B filed a motion contesting the jurisdiction
of the Marseilles court to hear the action. He also asserted that, in view
of the spouses' common domicile in Madrid, Spanish rather than
French law should be applied to the merits of the action. Spanish law
however prohibits the granting of divorces.2
2. French National Spouse v. French National Spouse re
The Validity of a PriorForeign Divorce Decree.
Spouses C and D were French nationals; they had met and were
married in Paris. Shortly afterwards, they moved to the U.S., where
* Thomas E. Carbonneau is a Jervey Fellow, Parker School of Foreign
Comparative Law.
1. These actions typically involve one of three basic fact patterns: (1)
spouses of mixed nationality, e.g. a French and foreign national spouse; (2) spouses
of common foreign nationality who are domiciled in France; (3) two French nationals who have either been married abroad or who are currently domiciled in a
foreign country. See also text infra, at n. 2 to 6. For a general description of the
legal issues associated with international divorce actions, see Breton & H6braud,
Divorce §§ 1771-1835, in 3 Dalligny, Ripert & Verge (eds.), Dalloz Encyclopddie
Juridique Rdpertoire de Droit Civil 101, 232-38 (1953); Divorce §§ 382-400, in 2
Dalligny, Segogne & Verge (eds.), Dalloz Nouveau Rgpertoirede Droit 113, 142-43
(2d ed. 1963) [unsigned article] (see also Mise d Jour 649, § 621 [1977]).
2. Spanish or, until recently, Italian nationals domiciled in France quite frequently brought divorce actions before French courts. See e.g. Vigliotti c. dame
Cuttilli, 64 Rev. Crit.Dr. Int'l Priv. 241 (1975) [Trib. grde instance Bobigny 27 Nov.
1973]; Dame X ... c. Y...,
2 Gaz. Pal.Sommaires at 192 (1975) [Cr. de Paris 6e ch. 4
Jul. 1975]. These cases were decided before the new conflicts provisions came into
force.
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they became resident aliens and took teaching positions in New Hampshire. Some years later, they obtained a divorce from a court in Nevada
on the ground of irreconcilable differences. The court had applied
Nevada law to the merits notwithstanding that then-existing French
law did not recognize irreconcilable differences as a ground for divorce. Indeed, the issue of the applicability of French law had not even
been raised in the proceeding.
After the divorce, C remained in the U.S. and D returned to France
where she married a French national some years later. This second
union was far from being felicitous; as a consequence, D filed a divorce
action before a Paris tribunal. Her husband however filed a motion
contesting the validity of their marriage. He contended that D was still
3
married to C because the Nevada divorce had no legal effect in France.
3. Foreign National Spouses With Immigrant Status in France.
Spouse E, an Egyptian national, and Spouse F, a Tunisian national,
were immigrant workers in France. They had been married in Tunisia
and returned to their respective countries of origin every summer. After
several years of marriage, E filed a divorce action before the Tribunal
de grande instance in Lyon, asserting that the French court should
apply Egyptian law in view of his nationality. F however contended
that, under the provisions of her national law, Tunisian law was governing; she submitted that it should be applied to the merits of the
action on that basis and on the additional ground that the marriage was
celebrated in her country of origin. E replied that, in the event Egyptian
law was not designated as the governing law, the court should 4 apply
French law in light of the spouses' common domicile in France.
4.

Spouses of ForeignNationality with DomiciliaryStatus in France.

G and H, a Belgian couple, had been domiciled in France for two
years. Both were students and intended to return to Belgium the following year when their fellowship support expired. They had been living
separately for a number of months owing to marital difficulties. At the
outset of the third year and during G's absence from France, H filed a
divorce action before the Tribunal de grande instance in Paris. Although a copy of the summons had been delivered to the city hall at G's
place of residence, she was not served personally with notice. The court
nonetheless granted the divorce, applying French law as the governing
law in light of the spouses' common domicile in France. Upon returning
to France, G appealed the judgment. Although she did not contest the
French court's jurisdiction, she did contend that Belgian law, which is
more restrictive than French law in the area of divorce,5 should have
been applied to the merits of the action in virtue of the spouses'
common Belgian nationality. 6
3. The facts of this hypothetical situation are similar to the Rivi~re case (infra
at n. 20-22).
4. For a discussion of the legal principles that would apply in these circumstances, see text infra at n. 39-44.
5. Francescakis, "Le surprenant article 310 nouveau du Code civil sur le divorce international," 64 Rev. Crit. Dr. Int'l Priv. 553, 564 (1975).
6. For a discussion of the legal principles that would apply in these circumstances, see text infra at n. 48-52.

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE

LAW

[Vol. 2 6

Although disparate, the facts of these four hypothetical cases point
to and are unified by two salient legal issues: one jurisdictional in
nature and the other pertaining to a choice of law determination. Firstly, as a preliminary matter, the party opposing the divorce almost
invariably raises a jurisdictional objection, alleging that by virtue of
foreign nationality and/or domicile, the French courts lack jurisdiction
to hear the matter. Secondly, in the event that the jurisdictional objection is unsuccessful, the party advances a choice of law argument,
requiring the court to apply a set of choice of law rules to determine
whether French or foreign law will govern the merits of the proceeding.
In an action involving a French national, the jurisdictional objection often is made to no avail. Under the provisions of the Code Civil,
French courts have jurisdiction to rule upon the merits of the action
simply on the basis that one of the parties is a French national:
Art. 14. The foreigner, even [one] not residing in France, can
be cited before French tribunals, for the execution of obligations that he contracted in France with a French national; he
can be brought before French tribunals, for obligations he
contracted in a foreign country toward French nationals.7
Art. 15. A French national can be brought before French
Tribunals, for obligations that he contracted in a foreign
country, even with a foreigner.8
Moreover, Art. 3 Code Civil provides that French law will govern
matters pertaining to the personal status of French nationals.9 Although the literal language of Article 3 would require the automatic
application of French law to an international divorce action involving a
French national, the courts have given that provision a reciprocal interpretation, taking it to mean that personal status actions are governed
by the national law of the persons in question. 10 As a consequence, Art.
3 does not resolve the choice of law issue: unless the spouses have a
shared citizenship-whether foreign or French-factors other than
nationality will determine the law governing the merits of the divorce
action. 1' In order to deal with this issue prior to the recent promulgation of the new Art. 310 Code Civil, French courts had recourse to
choice of law rules which promoted the reciprocity of national law in
international litigation.' 2 This set of judicially-created rules established a clear hierarchy between various possible sources of governing
law: in reaching a determination, the courts were to choose, in order of
7. "L'dtranger, mrme non r~sidant en France, pourra Ctre cit6 devant les
tribunaux frangais, pour l'ex6cution des obligations par lui contract6es en France
avec un Frangais; il pourra 6tre traduit devant les tribunaux de France, pour les
obligations par lui contract6es en pays 6tranger envers des Frangais."
8. "Un Frangais pourra 6tre traduit devant un tribunal de France, pour des
obligations par lui contract~es en pays 6tranger, m6me avec un 6tranger."
9. "Les lois concernant l'6tat et la capacit6 des personnes r6gissent les Frangais, m6me r~sidant en pays dtrangers."
10. See Francescakis, supra n. 5.
11. See text infra at n. 13-26.
12. See text infra at n. 27-28.
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preference, between the common national law, the law of the common
domicile, and the law of the forum. The ultimate result, of course,
depended upon the particular facts of each case.
THE OLD CHOICE OF LAW RULES

Although its doctrine was to be abandoned by later courts, De
Ferraric. dame de Ferrari" was the first case of major importance to
deal with the choice of law problems arising in the international divorce context. There Ms. Gensoul had married an Italian national in
France in 1893, and moved to Italy. In 1899, the spouses obtained a
judicial separation in Genoa, the decree conforming to Italian law and
based on mutual consent. Ms. Gensoul then returned to France, but in
1915, filed suit in Lyon to convert the Italian separation into a French
divorce. The Lyon court assumed jurisdiction over the action pursuant
to Art. 14 Code Civil, and granted the plaintiff's petition. 4
On appeal, the Cour de Cassation ruled that a French national
could file an action to convert a judicial separation into a divorce
judgment despite the fact that the separation had been obtained in a
foreign jurisdiction and that the national law of one of the spouses did
not recognize divorce. The court, however, reversed the decision of the
Lyon court, holding that, since the Italian separation decree was based
upon mutual consent, it could not be converted into a French divorce
because French law did not recognize mutual consent as a ground for
divorce.
Although the court had clearly chosen French law as applicable,
legal scholars and subsequent courts were uncertain about which
choice of law analysis the court had adopted in order to reach that
result.' 5 On the one hand, the holding could be seen as reflecting a
"distributive" analysis, rendering the respective national laws of the
two spouses equally applicable to the merits of the action. In the instant
case, since the plaintiff was a French national, French law governed the
merits.' 6 However, the simultaneous applicability of both national laws
under the distributive choice of law reasoning resulted in an anomalous
situation: while, under his national law, the husband could obtain at
best a separation from his spouse, his wife, by virtue of her national
law, had the right, at least theoretically, of dissolving the conjugal
relationship entirely. 7 On the other hand, the holding could be interpreted as a "cumulative" analysis, i.e., the court designated French law
as the governing law solely on the ground that one of the parties to the
action was a French national. Although the cumulative analysis was
consistent in outcome, it amounted to a preponderance of French over
foreign law solely on the basis of French nationality. Such a rationale
13. 1 Dalloz Jur. Gen., "Cour de Cassation" at 137 (1922) [Cr. de Cassation Ch.
civ Ire 6 Jul. 1922].
14. Id.
15. See e.g. 2 Battifol, Droit InternationalPriv6 70 (6th ed. 1976). For a summary of the court decisions following the Ferrari case, see id. at n. 59-3.
16. Id. at 70.
17. Id.
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was incompatible with the need to promote reciprocity in international
litigation.1 8 Hence to avoid this interpretation, the Ferrari holding
came to be regarded as establishing a distributive choice of law rule.19
However its success as a doctrinal prouncement was short-lived. In
subsequent cases, the courts abandoned the Ferraricourt's distributive
analysis entirely.
In Riviire c. Rividre,2° the courts began to enunciate a more uniform set of doctrinal rules by which to determine the governing law in
international divorce cases. Here Lydia Roumiantzeff, a naturalized
French citizen of Russian origin, had married a Russian national, Dimitri Petrov, in Paris in 1934. The parties subsequently moved to
Equador where, in 1936, they obtained a divorce by mutual consent
under Equadorian law. Dimitri later became a naturalized Equadorian
citizen and married a Russian national in Buenos Aires in 1938. In 1939
Lydia married a French national, Robert Rivi~re, in Morocco. In 1945
she filed suit before a tribunal in Casablanca, seeking a divorce from
her second husband. He, in turn, filed a countersuit to have his marriage with Lydia declared null and void, alleging that, at the time of
their marriage, she was still married to Petrov since the Equadorian
divorce based on mutual consent was not legally valid in France. 21 The
court agreed with him, reasoning on the basis of the distributive analysis that, since Lydia was a French national and had been married in
France, French law should have been applied. However, French law did
not recognize mutual consent as a ground for divorce, with the result
that the Equadorian divorce had no legal effect in France.
The Cour d'appel of Rabat in turn reversed that decision, ruling
that the law applicable to spouses of different nationality should be
either (1) the husband's national law; (2) the law of the common
domicile, or (3) the law of the forum in which the action is brought.
While it did not choose between them because they all recognized
mutual consent, the court did overrule explicitly the distributive analysis of the Ferraricourt upon which the Casablanca tribunal had relied,
emphasizing the need to achieve national and international uniformity
in personal status matters:
[T]he distributive application of the national law of each
spouse should be formally disregarded as arbitrary and juridically impossible [to apply] in determining the effects of marriage and the sanction of the obligations of marriage that divorce constitutes since the rights of one spouse have as a
counterpart the obligations of the other; that there exists in
divorce matters a veritable indivisibility; that it is important to
both the national and international interest, that two spouses
18. Id.
19. E.g., Francescakis, "Le divorce d'6poux de nationalit6 diff6rente," 43 Rev.
Crit. Dr. Int'l Priv. 325, 327, 327 n. 2 (1954).
20. 38 Rev. Crit. Dr. Int'l Priv. 107 (1949) [Cr. d'appel de Rabat 30 Nov. 1948].
See also Batiffol, Note, id. at 109-12; "Recognition in France of Foreign Decrees
Divorcing Spouses of Different Nationality," 4 Am. J. Comp. L. 574 (1955);
Lagarde, "Destindes de 'arr~t Rivibre," 98 J. Dr. Int'l-Clunet 241 (1971).
21. 38 Rev. Crit. Dr.Int'l Priv., supra n. 20 at 107-08.
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either be not married or divorced but not at the same time one
and the other.
But the Cour de Cassationhad the last word: it upheld the ruling of
the Rabat court by giving reciprocal effect to Art. 3 Code Civil.2 2 It
declared that, in cases involving personal status, the sole fact that one
of the parties is a French national is not sufficient in all cases to render
French law obligatory. The merits of a divorce proceeding between a
French and a foreign national, both of whom were domiciled in the
same foreign jurisdiction, were "governed by the law of the domicile,
which was, in addition, identical to the husband's national law and the
law of the forum." The "in addition" clause created some uncertainty in
regard to the priority that was to be established between the three
possible sources of governing law, 23 but a few years later the court
clarified this ambiguity.
In Dame Lewandowski c. Lewandowski, 24 a Polish national,
domiciled in France, filed an action before a French tribunal for divorce
from his French wife (who was also domiciled in France). The lower
court granted the divorce on account of injures graves (moral cruelty),
reasoning that the husband's national law recognized that ground for
divorce. The Cour de Cassation reversed, holding that French law
should have been applied. It thereby established as a clear and mistakable choice of law rule that the law of the common domicile governed
the merits of an international divorce proceeding in the absence of
common nationality between the spouses. 25 The judicial doctrine
elaborated in these cases, however, left one problem unresolved: viz.,
which law to apply in the event the spouses had neither a common
nationality nor a common domicile?
26
The court addressed that problem in Tarwid c. dame Wirtensohn
where a Polish national had married a French national in London in
1947. Although the couple remained in England after their marriage,
when they separated the wife returned to France and her husband
remained in England. In February 1955, she filed for divorce in France
on the basis of Art. 14 Code Civil, but her husband countered that
English, not French, law should be applied since his legal domicile was
English. The Cour de Cassation however decided in favor of the forum
law:
[T]he divorce of spouses of different nationality is governed by
the law of the common domicile if they are both integrated into
the local milieu by having an effective residence in the same
country; if they live separately in different countries, the divorce proceeding is governed by the law of the forum which has
jurisdiction to hear the matter.
22. Rivi~re c. Roumiantzeff, 42 Rev. Crit. Dr. Int'l Priv. 412 (1953) [Cr. de
Cassation Ch. civ. ire Sect. civ. 17 Apr. 1953]. See also Batiffol, Note, id. at 414-21;
Lagarde, supra n. 20.
23. See Batiffol, supra n. 22 at 420.
24. 44 Rev. Crit. Dr.Int'l Priv. 320 (1955) [Cr. de Cassation Ch. civ. Sect. civ. 15
Mar. 1955]. See also Batiffol, Note, id. at 322-25.
25. See Batiffol, supra n. 24 at 323.
26. 50 Rev. Crit.Dr. Int'l Priv. 547 (1961) [Cr de Cassation Ch. civ. 1re Sect. 15
May 1961]. See also Batiffol, Note, id. at 548-53.
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The doctrine expressed in these cases established a comprehensive
set of rules by which the courts could deal with the choice of law issues
in international divorce actions. It clearly established for example that
although a French national was a party to the action, French law
relating to personal status did not apply automatically-nor did the
husband's national law. Rather, for the sake of reciprocity and to
preserve judicial equality between the spouses, the courts would, in the
absence of a common nationality, designate, in order of preference,
either the law of the common domicile or the law of the forum. This
pattern has now been replaced by the new Art. 310 Code Civil.
THE NEW ART.

310

CODE CIVIL

The new Art. 310 was enacted as part of the law of 11 July 197527
which substantially modified existing French divorce law. The article
contains three choice of law rules which determine the applicability of
French law in international divorce actions. The article reads:
The divorce and separation [of spouses] is governed by French law:
-when one and the other spouse are of French nationality;
-when the spouses have, one and the other, their domicile on
French territory;
-when no foreign law recognizes itself as governing, once the
French courts have jurisdiction to hear a divorce or separation
action.2 8
The language of Art. 310 has generated considerable scholarly
criticism.2 9 The chief feature of the choice of law rules contained in the
article, in contrast to the previous judicial rules, is their "unilateralist"
character. That is to say, instead of promulgating rules indicating when
both national and foreign law are to be applied, the legislature contented itself with enumerating only those instances in which French law
is mandatory. In the opinion of one commentator, although the legislature apparently intended to codify previously established conflicts doctrine, the unilateralist character of the Art. 310 choice of law rules in
fact represents a complete depature from the jurisprudence elaborated
in Rivi~re and refined by its progeny.
27. Law No. 75-618 of 11 July 1975, (1975) J.O. 7178, Dalloz, Logislation at 254

(1975). For an analysis of the new law, see e.g. Glendon "The French Divorce
Reform Law of 1976," 24 Am. J. Com. L. 199 (1976); Lasok, "The Reform of French
Divorce Law," 51 Tul. L. Rev. 259 (1977).
28. "Le divorce et la separation de corps sont regis par la loi frangaise:
"-lorsque l'un et l'autre 4poux sont de nationalit6 frangaise;
"-lorsque les 6poux ont, l'un et l'autre, leur domicile sur le territoire frangais;
"-lorsque aucune loi 6trang~re ne se reconnait competence, alors que les
tribunaux frangais sont comptents pour connaitre du divorce ou de la s6paration de corps."
29. Cornec, "Le Nouveau Divorce International," 2 Gaz. Pal. Doctrine at 612;
Foyer, "Tournant et Retour aux Sources en Droit International Priv6?", La
Semaine JuridiqueJCP Doctrine No. 2762 (18 Feb. 1976); Francescakis, supra n. 5;
Simon-Depitre, "Le nouve article 310 du Code civil," 103 J. Dr. Int'l-Clunet 823
(1976); see also Mayer, Droit Int'l Priv6 412-17 (1977). One scholar has characterized the article as the "product of too little thought" and "[an] improvisation":
Francescakis, supra n. 5 at 554.
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Rule 1
The first provision of Art. 310 is the most traditional and least
problematic of the three rules. It provides that French law will govern
when both spouses are French nationals, following in effect the basic
orientation of Art. 3 Code Civil, which applies French law to the
personal status of French nationals. Like Art. 3, this rule can be applied
reciprocally so that international divorce actions would be governed by
the national (possibly foreign) law common to both spouses.30 But once
the provision is interpreted bilaterally, there will be no choice of law
31
rule for spouses with different nationalities. According to one scholar,
this lacuna stems from the original unilateral character of the provision
itself.
Rule 2
The second provision of Art. 310 represents a partial innovation.
According to its proponents, this second choice of law rule was intended to deal with immigrant spouses who seek a divorce in France." In
their view, the doctrine of the Riv~re case and its progeny misunderstood the needs and desires of the numerous immigrant families in
France, since it denied to them the law of their new common domicile if
they shared the same foreign citizenship. Although the first rule of Art.
310 requires application of French law when an action involves two
French nationals notwithstanding the fact that they may have a
common foreign domicile, the second rule establishes a different standard to deal with foreign nationals living on French soil. The justification for this separate treatment centers upon the notion of l'esprit de
retour, the desire of foreign nationals to return eventually to their
mother country. 3 Although they offer no statistical support, its proponents argue that French nationals residing abroad retain a desire to
return to France, while the foreign nationals in France have lost any
wish to reintegrate themselves into their country of origin. Accordingly,
to apply any other than French law would constitute a misreading of
existing reality: the national law of these foreign immigrants reflects
principles and mores alien to their present environment. Moreover,
courts,
ascertaining their national law would place an onus upon the
34
besides involving the risk of having it applied inaccurately.
While this reasoning is well-intentioned, albeit smacking of an
outmoded and extreme form of paternalism, it nonetheless makes for
unequal treatment which is buttressed by pure conjecture at best.
Moreover, it fails to account for the situation in which the dissolution of
marriage would mean for at least one of the immigrant spouses a return
to the country of national origin. In that event, would the French
divorce be recognized by the national courts of the foreign country?
Would the French courts have applied the choice of law rules required
by the law of the foreign country? Would the ground upon which
30. See Francescakis, supra n. 5 at 561.
31. See id. Accord, Simon-Depitre, supra n. 29 at 826-27.
32. See Foyer, supra n. 29, at No. 2762.

33. Id.
34. Id.

454
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divorce was granted be recognized by the foreign law? Indeed, do the
laws of the country of origin recognize divorce at all?
The weakness of the reasoning is compounded by the assertion that
foreign law is not only difficult to ascertain, but also likely to be
misapplied. As the discussion immediately below Will illustrate, those
misgivings apparently were completely forgotten in relation to the third
provision of Art. 310, which obliges French courts, at least in theory, to
engage in the task of determining and reconciling the choice of law
rules possibly of several different countries. As one prominent French
internationalist has noted,3 5 the second provision of Art. 310 may well
lead many foreign countries, concerned about the inapplicability of
their own laws, to negotiate bilateral conventions on personal status
with France.
Finally, the concept of common domicile contained in the second
rule could have unanticipated consequences. While the spouses to a
divorce action must be both domiciled in France in order for French law
to apply, they need not be living together in order to satisfy the requirements of common domicile. Depending upon what precise legal definition the courts eventually affix to the term, the application of the
concept of common domicile conceivably could have the consequence of
transforming France, as it were, into a European Reno. 38 Foreigners
whose national law on divorce is particularly restrictive would be
encouraged to establish some sort of domicile in France and to seek a
divorce under the second rule of Art. 310. In such cases, it is hoped that
the courts will engage in an assiduous scrutiny of the record to determine whether the parties have actually established bona fide domiciles
in France. Such an inquiry will probably prove as cumbersome as the
ascertainment and application of foreign law. Moreover, like the first
provision of Art. 310, the second could also be given reciprocal effect,
i.e., subjecting a divorce between spouses of the same foreign domicile
to the law of that common domicile. 37 As noted earlier, the bilateral
interpretation of both these rules, while promoting reciprocity between
national legal systems, would leave rather significant lacunae in the
cover spouses of
French choice of law rules: thus Art. 310 would not
38
neither common nationality nor common domicile.
Rule 3
The third rule of Art. 310 is the most innovative of the three.
Although intended, 9 at least in part, to support the Rivire principle
that divorce, regardless of its international character, should be governed by one national law only, it marks a complete departure from
former choice of law principles. 40 Due to its negative formulation, the
courts cannot give the provision reciprocal effect. 41 Consequently, when
a French court assumes jurisdiction in a suit between, e.g., a French and
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

See
Id.
See
Id.
See
See
See

Francescakis, supra n. 5 at 560.
Francescakis, supra n. 5 at 561.
Foyer, supra n. 29, at No. 2762.
e.g. Simon-Depitre, supra n. 29 at 824.
Francescakis, supra n. 5 at 563.
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a Spanish national, both of whom are domiciled in their respective
countries, it will apply foreign law whenever the choice of law rules of
the foreign country designate its law as governing.4 2 Although it is
unclear whether the parties bear the burden of raising the applicability
of foreign law or the court may raise it sua sponte, once the issue is
before the court, it must ascertain and apply not only the foreign
conflicts principles and reconcile them with their French counterparts,
but also eventually gain an awareness of the substance of the foreign
law and apply it correctly.4 3 In some cases involving spouses who are
not domiciled in France but in two different countries other than those
of their national origin, several foreign laws may be applicable. In these
circumstances, it will be incumbent upon the French courts to devise
judicial criteria for choosing between the various foreign laws and
conflicts principles. Hence a French citizen, whose spouse is a foreign
national and living abroad, may well be subject to foreign law, despite
the fact that he brought the action before a French court. Divorce may
even be impossible altogether, e.g. between a French and a Spanish
national who are domiciled in their respeetive countries. Presumably,
according to the new French rules, Spanish law (if its conflicts principles designate it as governing) would apply in such a case. Yet Spanish
law prohibits divorce. One possible solution to this impasse might be
for the French courts to declare the application of such a foreign law to
be against French public policy (l'ordre public). How the courts will
deal with an applicable foreign law, which, although not entirely prohibiting divorce, is more restrictive than French law, also remains to be
seen. In any event, it is hoped that the courts will not treat the choice of
law rules contained in Art. 310 as an exhaustive enumeration of the
possible solutions to the multifarious conflicts problems that can arise
44
in the context of international divorce actions.
The new rules also raise considerable problems in the related area
of enforcing foreign divorces in France. 45 Although foreign divorces are
recognized in France without any judicial action, the granting of an
exequatur becomes indispensable if the decree is introduced into a
French jurisdiction for purposes of enforcement. In order to be granted
an exequatur, the foreign judgment must satisfy five conditions, one of
which requires that the foreign court must have applied the law designated by the French choice of law rules. 41 In the case of two foreign
nationals of different nationalities who were domiciled in France but
were divorced in one of the countries of their national origin according
to its law, the French courts, under the provisions of Art. 310, would be
42.
issues
Law,"
43.
44.

As one commentator has noted, this new choice of law rule would also raise
under the renvoi doctrine. See Ecolivet-Herzog, "The New French Divorce
11 Int'l Lawyer 483, 498 (1977).
See e.g. Cornec, supra n. 29 at 613-14.
See Francescakis, supra n. 5 at 563.

45. See e.g. Cornec, supra n. 29 at 614.
46. These five conditions were laid down in the celebrated Munzer case, 91 J.
Dr. Int'l-Clunet 302 (1964) [Cr. de Cassation Ch. civ. 1re Sect. civ. 7 Jan. 1964]. See
also Goldman, Note, id. at 304-09; Nadelmann, "French Courts Recognize Foreign

Money Judgments: One Down and More to Go," 13 Am. J. Comp. L. 72 (1964);
generally Herzog, Civil Procedurein France ch. 14 (1967).
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obliged to deny the request for exequatur. The spouse seeking to have
the judgment enforced in France would be left without any judicial
remedy, except to initiate a second divorce proceeding-this time in
France. Conversely, as mentioned previously,4" the possible laxity of the
domiciliary requirement of Art. 310 would render the recognition and
enforcement of French divorce judgments abroad more difficult.
These latent doctrinal and practical problems will, of course, surface only in future litigation. Their effective resolution will depend,
almost exclusively, upon judicial ingenuity and imagination. Although
Art. 310 only became effective on 1 January 1976, the. courts already
have begun the task of implementing and interpreting it. The relatively few decisions already confirm at least some of the apprehensions
raised in the foregoing analysis.
RECENT DECISIONS

In Dame Lofiego c. Lofiego,4 8 two Brazilian nationals domiciled in
Brazil were granted a judicial separation on the ground of mutual
consent by a Sao Paulo tribunal. The wife subsequently established a
domicile in Paris and brought an action before a Paris court, seeking to
convert the Brazilian separation into a French divorce decree. The
husband, although not present at the proceeding nor personally served
with notice, maintained a residence in France; notice was served by
delivering a copy of the summons at the city hall of his alleged residence
inFrance.
Ruling on the jurisdictional issues, the court declared that a foreign
separation can be converted into a French divorce provided the foreign
decree was based on grounds recognized as divorce grounds by the law
governing the conversion action. The court went on to state that, even in
the absence of an explicit request, it must determine whether the
foreign judgment conformed to the requirements of international procedural and substantive regularity. It ruled that the Sao Paulo court
had jurisdiction, had conducted the proceeding according to accepted
procedure, and had applied the law designated as the governing law by
French conflicts rules then in force-namely, Brazilian law by virtue of
the common nationality of the spouses. Since the decision did not
violate French -public policy, the judgment was enforceable in France.
Regarding the request for conversion, the court noted that both
spouses were now domiciled in France. Since the request had been
submitted to the court after the new conflicts rules came into force, Art.
310 applied. According to its second rule and because both spouses
were domiciled in France, French law was therefore the governing law
despite the spouses' common Brazilian nationality.
Still, the court denied the conversion on the ground that Art. 307
Code Civil4 9 requires conversion of a separation by mutual consent to
47. See text supra at n. 35.
48. 66 Rev. Crit. Dr. Int'l Priv. 335 (1977) [Trib. grde Instance de Paris Ire Ch. 20
Jan. 1977]. See also Gaudemet-Tallon, Note, id. at 337-44.
49. "In all cases involving separation, the latter can be converted into a divorce
by the request of both spouses. When the separation was granted on the ground of
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be requested by both parties. Art. 307 applied not only as a procedural
rule of the forum, but also on substantive grounds: to implement the
guarantee of Art. 23250 by which the legislature intended to assure a
spouse that his acceptance of a separation by mutual consent would not
result in a unilateral divorce.
The court's interpretation of Art. 310 does indeed confirm the
misgivings that many French scholars expressed about the future application of the new choice of law rules. While the record established that
both spouses were presently domiciled in France, the court gave precious little scrutiny to the questionable character of the husband's
French domicile. Apparently, it simply accepted the documentation
submitted to it which established that Mr. Lofiego had registered as a
resident of Bourg-la-Reine. In light of the fact that Brazilian law does
not recognize divorce and in view of the husband's conspicuous absence
from his French residence and his failure even to retain counsel, one
would suspect either collusion on the part of the spouses to obtain a
divorce in spite of the prohibition of Brazilian law or unilateral fraud
on the part of the plaintiff.
Yet, there is no hint in the official decision that the court suspected
either of these two possibilities. The court simply confined itself to a
superficial scrutiny of the record and applied rather literally the second
rule of Art. 310. Nor did the court give reciprocal effect to the first rule
of Art. 310. Under the old conflicts rules, it would have applied the
national law common to both spouses, viz. Brazilian law. Presumably,
the request for conversion would have been denied on the ground that
Brazilian law did not then recognize divorce. Although the court
achieved the same result by applying another provision of French law,
its distinctly uncritical application of the common domicile concept
bespeaks a laxity that could render French jurisdictions a haven for
foreign nationals seeking to escape the rigors of their own national
divorce laws. In any event, the court could have applied the third rule of
Art. 310. Ascertaining and applying Brazilian conflicts rules and substantive divorce provisions did not present, at first blush at least,
insurmountable difficulties. Had the court deemed the relevant Brazilian laws to be fundamentally repugnant, it could have declared them
contrary to French ordre public and applied French law on that more
legitimate basis.
The other recent international divorce cases have not dealt directly
with the interpretation of the three new choice of law rules, but af5
firmed the traditional principle that, under Art. 14 and 15 Code Civil, '
the spouses' mutual consent, it cannot be converted into a divorce except by a new
request by both spouses." The French text of the article reads: "Dans tous les cas
de separation de corps, celle-ci peut tre convertie en divorce par demande
conjointe. Quand la separation de corps a W prononc~e sur demande conjointe,
elle ne peut 6tre convertie en divorce que par une nouvelle demande conjointe."
50. "The judge will grant a divorce if he is convinced that the desire of each
spouse [to obtain a divorce] is real and that each of them has freely given his
agreement.
...
The French text of art. 232 reads: "Le juge prononce le divorce s'il
a acquis la conviction que la volont6 de chacun des 6poux est r~elle et que chacun
d'eux a donn( librement son accord ....
51. See text supra at and accompanying n. 7 and 8.
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the French courts have jurisdiction over an action brought by a French
national on the exclusive basis of his nationality, notwithstanding the
fact that foreign law may govern the substantive merits.
In Dame L . . . c. son mari,5 2 both spouses had been domiciled in
Rome for several years. They lived there together with their child and
taught school. The wife was a native of Paris, had been married there,
and had given birth to their child in the French capital. Upon returning
from Italy, she filed for divorce in Paris. At this initial stage of the
proceeding, the case was before a family law judge whose official duties
consist in attempting a reconciliation of the'spouses before and during
the court proceeding, his judicial competence being limited to matters
relating to the jurisdiction of the court.53 The husband contested the
applicability of French law, as the case did not fit any of the three
hypothetical 'situations adumbrated by Art. 310. He further contended
that, since the couple was domiciled in Italy, Italian law would be
applicable.
The Tribunal de grande instance of Paris however ruled that the
conflicts issue was without the family law judge's competence and
irrelevant to a determination of whether the French courts had jurisdiction to hear the action. The court declared that, in French private
international law, Art. 14 and 1"5 Code Civil were still in effect so that a
French national could sue for divorce in France although the other
spouse was a foreign national and resided abroad-providing that
choice did not smack of fraud or represent an abuse of procedure.
Ultimately, it was up to the petitional court to determine whether
French or Italian law governed on the merits.
G . . . c. sa femme5 4 was an almost identical case from both a
procedural and substantive point of view. It nevertheless deserves mention for the sake of completeness and the court's dicta. Mr. de G. . ., a
French national, lived with his wife, apparently a U.S. citizen, and
children for many years in Kansas City. In 1968, he returned to France
and established a domicile in Paris. His wife remained in the U.S. with
their two children. Mr. de G . . . filed a divorce action before a Paris
court, asserting that French law should govern the proceeding by virtue
of his French domicile; his wife contested the French jurisdiction since
her residence was in the U.S. and further alleged that French law was
inapplicable to the merits, since the case did not fall into any of the
categories of Art. 310.
As to the court's jurisdiction, the Tribunal de grande instance of
Paris held that the Decree of 5 December 1975, (which designates "the
tribunal of the place where the family resides") 55 had effect only in
French domestic law and did not abrogate Art. 14 and 15 Code Civil.
Accordingly, under Art. 14, a French national could sue for divorce in
52. 96:2 Gaz. Pal. Jurisprudenceat 717 (1976) [Trib. grde Instance de Paris 12
Jul. 1976].
53. See generally Cornec, supra n. 29 at 613; Grosli~re, "Le juge aux affaires
matrimoniales," Dalloz Chronique at 73 (1976).
54. Supra n. 52 at 723 (1976) [Trib. grde Instance de Paris 3 May 1976].
55. D~cret No. 75-1124, art. 5, in Code Civil at 163, 164 (1976-77).
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France even if the other spouse was of foreign nationality and resided
abroad. Although the issue of the governing law was not strictly before
the court, it asserted by way of dictum that at least two of the Art. 310
provisions might apply to the instant case: (1) in the event that Mrs. de
G. . . acquired French nationality upon her marriage, the first rule of
Art. 310 would require the court to apply French law; and (2) in the
pleadings submitted thus far before the court, Mrs. de G . . . claimed
that the law of Colorado 56 did not state whether it applied to the merits
of a divorce proceeding in a foreign jurisdiction against one of its
residents. On that basis, the court opined that the third rule of Art. 310
would require the application of French law since the defendant admitted the inapplicability of her national (i.e., state) law.
Suffice it to state that the court's dicta were extremely conjectural
and, perhaps, imbued with some misplaced nationalism. On the one
hand, it was unlikely that the wife had assumed French citizenship
upon her marriage, since the couple resided in the U.S. until their
separation. On the other hand, a note submitted in preliminary pleadings should not suffice to determine the complex and delicate question
of which law should govern the merits of the proceeding. This is especially true in light of the lack of consensus and controversy that the new
conflicts rules have generated among French legal scholars and in view
of the fact that other considerations may impinge upon the ultimate
application of Art. 310 in the instant case.
CONCLUSION

The choice of law issues confronted by a French court in a contemporary international divorce action have not changed markedly in
character since the Ferraridecision; the jurisprudence of the courts,
however, has undergone two radical transformations. First, in an effort
to establish a more acceptable and less problematic judicial doctrine
than that advanced in Ferrari,the French courts, in Rivi~re and subsequent cases, devised a set of choice of law rules which were tailor-made
to deal with the conflicts problems arising in international divorce
cases. These rules were not only comprehensive, but also cogently articulated, besides promoting the principle of reciprocity. Although not
accounting for all the possible subtleties in a myriad of hypothetical
fact patterns, these rules nonetheless provided satisfactory answers to
classical questions. As such, they represented a not inconsiderable
achievement in judicial creativity.
Second, the choice of law jurisprudence was changed only recently, but this time by legislative decree. In view of the doctrinal and
practical viability of the previous rules, it is regrettable that the French
Parliament decided to intervene at all-all the more because it chose to
transform the entire orientation and substance of these rules with a
hasty and ill-conceived enactment. Rather than codify or supplement
existing law, the new statute revolutionized: tearing the fabric of doctrinal consensus in an already perplexing area and erecting obstacles to
the future elaboration of a cohesive doctrinal framework. Although the
56. Colorado being her present domicile.
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initial interpretations of the new provisions do not herald a new surge
of creativity and analytical clarity among the French courts, it is hoped
that they will respond to the negative challenge presented by Art. 310 in
much the same vein as did their predecessors in the Rivi~re-Tarwid
jurisprudence.

